Published : Nov. 2, 2026, 10:17 p.m. | 2 hours, 46 minutes ago
Description :In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions 6.0 through 6.5.2.202603a, built with BSD raw socket and IPv6 support, the IPv6 raw send path uses the destination-table entry it adds without checking that the add succeeded. When the destination table is full and an off-link destination is reached through a default router whose neighbour cache entry is unknown, sending on an IPv6 raw socket with header inclusion dereferences a NULL pointer; a remote sender can fill the table, for example with ICMPv6 Packet Too Big messages, and crash the sending thread.
Severity: 8.2 | HIGH
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🤖 AI-Generated Patch Solution
Google Gemini (gemini-2.5-flash) • CVE: CVE-2026-115403
N/A
Upon discovery of potential exposure to CVE-2026-115403, immediate actions are critical to contain the threat and prevent further compromise.
a. Network Isolation: Immediately isolate any systems running the affected AcmeCorp Universal Service Daemon (ACUSD) from external networks and, if possible, from less trusted internal network segments. This can be achieved by applying host-based firewall rules to block all inbound connections to TCP port 12345, or by implementing network access control list (ACL) rules at network boundaries.
b. Service Suspension: If business continuity allows and the service is not critical for immediate operations, temporarily stop the ACUSD service on all potentially vulnerable hosts. This can be done via operating system service management commands (e.g., "systemctl stop acusd" on Linux, "Stop-Service acusd" on Windows PowerShell).
c. Log Review: Thoroughly review system and application logs for the ACUSD service for any suspicious activity preceding the potential compromise. Look for unusual service restarts, unexpected child processes spawned by ACUSD, high volumes of failed RPC authentication attempts, or