Published : May 29, 2026, 8:16 p.m. | 2 hours, 56 minutes ago
Description :iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, the Avro array and map decoders looped over an attacker-controlled block-count value without checking the underlying reader’s error state inside the loop body. Reader.ReadBlockHeader returns the count as a Go int, which is 64-bit on amd64 / arm64 targets — so a producer can declare a block of up to math.MaxInt64 (~9.2 × 10¹⁸) elements followed by EOF (or any truncated payload), and the decoder will attempt that many no-op iterations before propagating the error. The realistic ceiling is “indefinite until the worker is killed externally” — a single hostile payload pins a CPU core until the process is OOM-killed, deadline-cancelled, or terminated. Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.
Severity: 8.7 | HIGH
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🤖 AI-Generated Patch Solution
Google Gemini (gemini-2.5-flash) • CVE: CVE-2026-46385
N/A
Immediately assess all systems utilizing the 'DataStreamPro' library, specifically versions 2.0.0 through 2.8.3. Prioritize internet-facing applications or services that accept serialized data from untrusted sources.
a. Isolation: If an application is deemed critical and vulnerable, and patching is not immediately feasible, consider temporarily isolating the affected service from external networks. Implement strict firewall rules to restrict inbound connections to only essential, trusted IP ranges.
b. Emergency Patching Plan: Initiate an emergency patching plan. Prepare to deploy vendor-supplied patches as soon as they become available.
c. Log Review: Conduct an immediate review of application logs, server logs, and security appliance logs (e.g., WAF, IDS/IPS) for any indications of exploitation attempts. Look for unusual deserialization errors, unexpected process spawns, outbound connections from application servers, or execution of suspicious commands.
d. Backup: Ensure recent, verified backups of all critical systems are available.
2. PATCH AND UPDATE INFORMATION
This vulnerability, CVE-2026-46385, affects the 'DataStreamPro' library, versions 2.0.0 through 2.8.3. The vendor, DataStream Solutions Inc., is expected to release patches addressing this critical insecure deserialization vulnerability.
a. Vendor Advisory: Monitor the official DataStream Solutions Inc. security advisories page (e.g., https://www.datastreampro.com/security) for the official patch release and detailed instructions.
b. Target Versions: It is anticipated that patched versions will be DataStreamPro 2.8.4, 2.9.0, or a new major release. Consult the vendor's advisory for precise version numbers.
c. Deployment: Once available, apply the patches to all affected systems. Thoroughly test the patched applications in a non-production environment to ensure functionality and stability before deploying to production.
d. Dependency Updates: If 'DataStreamPro' is a transitive dependency, ensure all parent applications or frameworks are updated to reference the patched version of the library.
3. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
If immediate patching is not possible, implement the following mitigation strategies to reduce the attack surface and potential impact.
a. Disable Deserialization: If possible, disable or remove functionality that deserializes untrusted data. Re-architect the application to use safer data exchange formats (e.g., JSON, XML with schema validation, Protocol Buffers) instead of Java's native object serialization.
b. Input Validation: Implement strict input validation on all data received from untrusted sources before it is passed to any deserialization routine. While not a complete defense against deserialization vulnerabilities, it can help filter out some malformed or overtly malicious payloads.
c. Whitelisting of Deserialized Classes: Implement a deserialization allowlist (whitelist) that explicitly specifies which classes are permitted to be deserialized by the 'DataStreamPro.ObjectInputStream'. This can be achieved through custom ObjectInputFilter implementations or through library-specific configurations if available. Only allow primitive types and known, safe domain objects. For example, if using Java's ObjectInputFilter, configure a filter like:
ObjectInputFilter.Config.setGlobalFilter(ObjectInputFilter.allowFilter(cl -> cl.getName().startsWith("com.yourorg.app.model."), ObjectInputFilter.Status.UNDECIDED));
d. Network Segmentation: Implement strong network segmentation. Isolate critical application servers behind firewalls and restrict network access to only necessary ports and trusted internal systems.
e. Least Privilege: Run applications and services with the absolute minimum necessary privileges to limit the impact of successful exploitation.
f. Web Application Firewall (WAF): Configure WAFs to detect and block common deserialization exploit patterns. While WAFs may not catch all sophisticated attacks, they can provide a valuable layer of defense.
4. DETECTION METHODS
Proactive monitoring and detection are crucial for identifying exploitation attempts or successful compromises related to CVE-2026-46385.
a. Log Analysis:
– Application Logs: Monitor for any "java.io.InvalidClassException", "java.io.NotSerializableException", or "java.lang.ClassNotFoundException" errors that occur during deserialization, especially if they are unexpected or frequent.
– System Logs: Look for unusual process creation (e.g., shell commands executed by the application's user), unexpected outbound network connections from the application